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(영문) 서울고등법원 2016.04.07 2015나27523
물품대금
Text

1. Defendant, among the parts against the Defendant in the judgment of the court of first instance, whose payments exceed the following amounts:

Reasons

1. Determination on the cause of the claim

A. Comprehensively taking account of the overall purport of arguments in the statements in Gap evidence Nos. 1 through 6, Eul evidence No. 7-1 through 42, and Eul evidence No. 1, it is recognized that the plaintiff supplied the defendant with building cost twice from January 2009 and from October 2014 to the defendant, the plaintiff was not paid 85,00,000 won out of the supply price of building cost as above (hereinafter "the first supply price"), and 36,763,796 won out of the supply price of building cost to October 2014 (hereinafter "the second supply price").

B. According to the above facts, the defendant is obligated to pay to the plaintiff 121,763,796 won (85,00,000 won) and damages for delay, barring special circumstances.

2. Judgment on the defendant's assertion

A. On March 13, 2009, the Defendant asserted that the primary supply price obligation was paid in kind, and on March 13, 2009, No. 501 (hereinafter “the apartment of this case”).

2) On March 13, 2009, the Plaintiff asserted to the effect that the first supply price obligation was paid in kind. In full view of the purport of the entire pleadings as indicated in the evidence No. 2 subparag. 1, the Plaintiff is deemed to have fulfilled the duty of social gathering construction industry Co., Ltd. (hereinafter “S. social gathering

A) The fact that the sales contract for the apartment of this case was concluded with the Plaintiff is recognized. However, if the payment is a physical contract that is established when another payment is actually made in lieu of the original obligation, the original obligation to be completed is extinguished if the payment is a transfer of ownership, and it is merely a promise for payment in kind unless the registration of transfer is made (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 79Da381, Sept. 11, 1979). Thus, the fact that the Plaintiff entered into the sales contract cannot be deemed to have extinguished the primary obligation to pay in lieu of the original obligation, and the Plaintiff’s future according to the sales contract of this case.

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