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본 영문본은 리걸엔진의 AI 번역 엔진으로 번역되었습니다. 수정이 필요한 부분이 있는 경우 피드백 부탁드립니다.
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(영문) 서울북부지방법원 2016.06.10 2015나6270
손해배상(기)
Text

1. Of the judgment of the first instance, the part against the Defendant (Counterclaim Plaintiff) is revoked, and the Plaintiff (Counterclaim Defendant) corresponding to that part is revoked.

Reasons

1. The Plaintiff’s determination as to the legitimacy of the appeal for subsequent completion does not mean that the Defendant was unable to observe the period of appeal on the grounds that the Defendant was served with a duplicate of the complaint of this case, and thus, the Defendant’s appeal for subsequent completion is unlawful.

According to the records in Gap evidence No. 5, although the defendant was served with a copy of the complaint on June 12, 2014, according to the statements in Eul evidence No. 1-6 and witness E of the trial court, the defendant did not have resided at the place of service, and E residing therein (the defendant's living together with the plaintiff's husband was a woman with a non-friendly relationship with the plaintiff's husband) took place, received the copy of the complaint, and made the defendant sign, and all the documents of the court of first instance were served by delivery or service by public notice upon the plaintiff's request. The defendant issued a seizure collection order [Yju District Court Decision No. 2015 other 3354 (hereinafter "the seizure collection order of this case").

[] It can be acknowledged that the court of first instance became aware of the existence of the judgment after being notified of the above order on August 10, 2015 from the Sejong Agricultural Cooperative, a garnishee, around August 10, 2015, and the defendant filed an appeal for the instant supplementary appeal with the court on the 19th of the same month is obvious in the record.

According to the above facts of recognition, if the defendant, who had been unaware of the fact that the lawsuit was brought due to the lack of legitimate delivery, knew of the existence of the judgment by public notice, was "after the cause has ceased to exist" as referred to in the requirements for subsequent supplementation of procedural acts, is not simply known of the fact that the judgment was rendered, but further, when he knew of the fact that the judgment was served by public notice within two weeks from the date when he became aware of the fact that the judgment was served by public notice was served by public notice (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2004Da8005, Feb. 24, 2006). Thus, the appeal of this case was filed within two weeks from the date on which the defendant was unable to observe the peremptory term due to the cause

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