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(영문) 서울고법 1973. 7. 18. 선고 71누309 제2특별부판결 : 상고
[부동산투기억제세부과처분취소청구사건][고집1973특,401]
Main Issues

(1) In the case of a transfer of real estate speculation control

Summary of Judgment

Where a contract of transfer for security is concluded as a means of securing repayment of a claim, the transfer of ownership shall not be deemed to fall under the "transfer" in the real estate investment suppression rate if the original owner is reinstated the registration of transfer of ownership based on sale and the ownership is returned to the original owner.

[Reference Provisions]

Articles 1 and 2 of the Act on Special Measures for the Suppression of Real Estate Speculation

Reference Cases

Supreme Court Decision 73Nu174 delivered on May 14, 1974 (Supreme Court Decision 10753Da10753 delivered on May 14, 197, Supreme Court Decision 22Na1 delivered on February 1, 200, Decision 2Da1950 delivered on Special Measures for the Suppression of Real Estate (Abolition)

Plaintiff

Gyeong Industrial Company

Defendant

B. The director of the tax office

Text

(1) The Defendant’s disposition of imposing KRW 298,680 on the Plaintiff as of January 19, 1971, which was imposed by the Plaintiff as of January 19, 1971, is revoked.

(2) Costs of lawsuit are assessed against the defendant.

Purport of claim

The same shall apply to the order.

Reasons

1. The fact that the defendant imposed a tax amount of KRW 298,680 on the plaintiff as of January 19, 1971 on the plaintiff as of December 19, 1971 is no dispute between the parties, and since it is an official document No. 2 (register of register) without dispute over the establishment, the plaintiff is presumed to have completed the registration of transfer of ownership as of February 27, 1970, according to each description of the evidence No. 1 (resolution of decision) which is presumed to have been proved to have been established. Thus, the plaintiff can be found to have transferred the registration of transfer of ownership as of May 31, 1968 on the ground that the plaintiff was not the non-party 1, who was the non-party of this case, from the non-party 1, and was the non-party of this case, the registration of transfer of ownership was transferred to the non-party 2 on March 3, 1970 as of February 27, 1970.

2. (A) Without dispute over the Plaintiff’s establishment, it is reasonable to view that Nonparty 1’s rights were transferred to Nonparty 2, Nos. 3 (O. 4), 5-1, 6-2, 8-1, 10-2, and 9-1, 6-2 (O. 7) as the collateral security interest of Nonparty 1, 6-2 (O. 7) and were assigned to Nonparty 1 for sale at the same time under the name of Nonparty 1, 6-1, 6-2, and 9-1, 6-1, 6-1, 6-1, 6-1, 6-1, 6-1, 6-1, 6-1, 6-1, 6-1, 6-1, 6-1, 6-2, 9, 6-1, 6-2, 9, 6-1, 6-1, 6-2, and 9-1, 6-2, 1,2,2,2, 6-1,2,2,2,2, and

(B) Article 1 of the Act on the Special Measures for the Suppression of Real Estate Investment provides that "The purpose of this Act is to restrain speculative real estate investment by imposing gains from the transfer of land (hereinafter referred to as "gains from the transfer of land")", which is, real estate speculation tax, i.e., the target tax, "the target tax for the purpose of suppressing speculative real estate investment", and the requirement of taxation is that "land gains from the transfer" arising from the transfer of land should exist. In addition, "transfer" under Article 2 subparagraph 2 of the same Act means that the ownership of the land is actually transferred for price due to sale, exchange, investment in kind to a corporation, etc., regardless of the registration of land, and it is easy that the concept of "transfer" under the Civil Act is not necessarily inconsistent with the concept of "transfer" under the same Act, but it is doubtful that the transfer registration is made for the purpose of securing ownership of the land from the original owner in the form of an agreement to secure ownership of the land (such as the title of transfer to the original owner).

In light of the concept of transfer of land (i.e., the actual transfer of land ownership) under Article 2 subparag. 2 of the above Act in consideration of the fact that the above Act is imposed on the transfer margin in order to restrain speculative real estate investment, the concept of transfer of land (i.e., the actual transfer of land ownership for consideration) should be interpreted differently from the concept of acquisition in the case of transfer transfer, such as the case of acquisition tax (not the purpose tax) in which only the right to dispose of realization and the right to preferential payment without the terms and conditions of accord and satisfaction are made. In other words, in the case of the so-called title trust, the concept of transfer should be interpreted differently from the concept of acquisition in the case of acquisition tax (not only the "trust" under the Trust Act, but also in the case of the so-called title trust, where the ownership transfer registration was made to the creditor for the purpose of securing the right to collateral, and it is again returned to the same owner (or the person designated by the original owner) as the original owner) (in addition to the case where the transfer registration is made to the debtor again from the same, if the transfer registration is made to the concept of ownership transfer.

3. Thus, since the Plaintiff’s transfer of ownership to Nonparty 2 cannot be deemed a transfer as referred to in Article 2 subparag. 2 of the above Act, since the Plaintiff’s transfer of ownership to Nonparty 2 cannot be deemed as the transfer of ownership to Nonparty 2. Thus, the Defendant cannot impose real estate speculation restraint.

Therefore, without examining the existence of land gains from transfer, the defendant's objection disposition is illegal. Therefore, the plaintiff's objection claim seeking the revocation of the above disposition is justified, and the costs of lawsuit are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the court below.

Judges Jeon Soo-chul (Presiding Judge)

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