The judgment below

The conviction portion is reversed, and this part of the case is remanded to Suwon District Court.

An appeal by a prosecutor.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. As to the defendants' grounds of appeal

A. Of the ancillary facts charged against Defendant A, the Defendants’ common assertion (1) as to aiding and abetting the third party bribe among the third party bribe charges and the ancillary facts charged against Defendant B is sufficient to specify the facts causing the public prosecution in light of the nature of the indicted crime by stating the date, time, place, method, and purpose, etc. to the extent that it can be distinguished from other facts charged. Even if some of the facts charged are unclear, the facts charged can be specified together with other matters indicated. Thus, if the Defendant’s defense right is not impeded, the validity of the public prosecution does not affect (see Supreme Court Decision 9Do1900, Jun. 25, 1999, etc.). The crime of receiving and receiving the third party bribe requires a public official or an arbitrator to give and accept a bribe to a third party upon receiving an unlawful solicitation in connection with his duties, and the specific scope of the Defendant’s unlawful solicitation is distinguishable not only from the express declaration of intent, but also from the specific facts that constitute the crime of receiving and receiving the bribe to the third party.

The contents of the illegal solicitation are sufficient to be specified to the extent that it can recognize the relationship between the duties of the public official or the arbitrator and the profits provided to a third party, even if not specifically stated.

For reasons indicated in its reasoning, the lower court: (a) the third party acceptance of bribe among the ancillary facts charged against Defendant A; and (b).