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(영문) 대구고등법원 2018.04.26 2017나23999
채무부존재확인
Text

1. The plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

Purport of claim and appeal

The first instance court.

Reasons

1. The reasons why the court should explain in this judgment are as stated in the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance except for the cases where a part of the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance is changed as stated in the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance, and thus, it shall be cited by the main sentence of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure

2. Parts to be dried;

(a)the following shall be added between conduct 9 and 10 of the first instance judgment:

Furthermore, an unfair legal act stipulated in Article 104 of the Civil Act is aimed at regulating an act of brushing, rashness, or influence by a person in a critical position. Therefore, even if the injured party was in an imminent state, if the injured party was aware of the circumstances on the part of the injured party, and thus, he/she did not constitute an unfair legal act as stipulated in Article 104 of the Civil Act, unless he/she was aware of such intent to use it, i.e., bad faith, or there was no significant imbalance between payment and consideration objectively (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2013Da40353, 40360, Sept. 26, 2013).

B. Article 16-19 of the fifth judgment of the court of first instance provides the following parts: “It is insufficient to recognize that, at the time of the preparation of the instant agreement, the Plaintiff was in an imminent difficult situation, or that there was a bad faith to use the agreement, or that there was a substantial imbalance between the payment and consideration under the sales contract on the instant real estate and the instant agreement, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge otherwise.”

Even if the evidence submitted by the Plaintiff to this court, including the above facts of recognition and the statements in Gap evidence Nos. 11 through 14, and all circumstances of its assertion, it cannot be recognized that the Plaintiff was in imminent condition at the time of the formation of the instant agreement, and even if it is assumed that the Plaintiff was in imminent condition, the Defendant also assumed that the Plaintiff was dead.

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