1. All appeals filed by the plaintiffs are dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal are assessed against the Plaintiffs.

The purport of the claim and appeal is the purport of the appeal.

1. The grounds for the court's explanation of this case are as follows: (a) the "Chairperson" of Part 13 of the Judgment of the first instance as "Chairperson of the Working Committee" shall be written; and (b) the "Evidence 7" shall be added to "No. 7 of the same Judgment" in Part 4 of the same Judgment; and (c) other than the supplementary explanation for the reasons for the judgment of the first instance as stated in the reasoning for the judgment of the first instance, it shall be cited as it is in accordance with the main sentence of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act.

Even if it is assumed that, around March 6, 2011, the time when the plaintiff received notification from the head of the Jeju Special Self-Governing Province 43 Office of notification that the deceased's harm was discovered can be seen as the final point when the causes that prevent the plaintiff from exercising his right objectively cease to exist, the plaintiff cannot accept the violation of the principle of good faith or the re-appeal

Even in cases where there exists a disability in which an obligee could not exercise his/her rights objectively against the Plaintiffs, the obligor’s defense of extinctive prescription may be avoided only within a reasonable period from the time such disability was terminated.

Here, whether there was an exercise of right within a reasonable period should be determined by comprehensively taking into account the relationship between the obligee and the obligor, and whether there were any special circumstances to delay the exercise of the obligee’s right.

However, denying the validity of the completion of extinctive prescription under the principle of trust and good faith should be limited to an exceptional limitation on the system of extinctive prescription, which adopts sanctions against the achievement of legal stability, the difficulty of proving, and the neglect of the exercise of rights. Thus, barring any special circumstance, the “reasonable period” of the exercise of rights should be limited in a short period corresponding to the suspension of prescription under the Civil Act.

Therefore, it is recognized that the period is extended due to special circumstances in individual cases.