1. The plaintiff's claim is dismissed.

2. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

1. Details of the disposition;

A. On June 16, 2016, the Plaintiff, as Egypt nationality, entered the Republic of Korea with tourism Tong (B-2) sojourn status, and applied for refugee status to the Defendant on July 5, 2016.

B. On July 11, 2016, the Defendant rendered a decision on the recognition of refugee status (hereinafter “instant disposition”) to the Plaintiff on the ground that the Plaintiff’s assertion does not constitute a case of “a well-founded fear that would be subject to persecution” as a requirement of refugee under Article 1 of the Convention on the Status of Refugees and Article 1 of the Protocol on the Status of Refugees.

C. The Plaintiff filed an objection with the Minister of Justice on August 1, 2016, but the said objection was dismissed on the same ground as in February 24, 2017.

[Reasons for Recognition] Facts without dispute, Gap 1, 2 evidence, Eul 1 and 2 evidence, and the purport of the whole pleadings

2. Whether the instant disposition is lawful

A. The plaintiff's assertion has died of a traffic accident in the country of nationality, and his bereaved family members are about to die of the plaintiff.

Therefore, the defendant's disposition of this case which did not recognize the plaintiff as a refugee despite high possibility that the plaintiff would be subject to gambling when he returns to the country of nationality is illegal.

B. The term “refugee” refers to a foreigner who is unable or does not want to be protected by the country of nationality due to well-founded fear to recognize that he/she may be injured on the grounds of race, religion, nationality, status as a member of a particular social group, or political opinion, or a stateless foreigner who, owing to such fear, is unable to return to or does not want to return to the country in which he/she resided before entering the Republic of Korea.

(Article 2 Subparag. 1 of the Refugee Act. However, even if the Plaintiff’s assertion is acknowledged, the threat of the Plaintiff’s assertion does not constitute persecution on the grounds of “human race, religion, nationality, status as a member of a specific social group, or political opinion.”