1. Revocation of a judgment of the first instance;

2. The Defendant’s indemnity against the Plaintiff on June 10, 2013 KRW 35,894,540.

1. As to the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance, “the details of the disposition of this case” from “the grounds of the judgment of the court of first instance”

A. The plaintiff's assertion;

B. Until the relevant statutes, the reasoning of the judgment of the first instance is as follows: (a) other than the partial completion of the judgment as set forth in paragraph (2) above (the second half to third half of the judgment of the first instance) is the same as the stated in each of the above parts (the second half to third half of the judgment of the first instance), and thus, it shall be cited in accordance with Article 8(2) of the Administrative Litigation Act and the main sentence of

2. Parts to be dried;

A. The second part of the judgment of the court of first instance “1. 17. 201. 17. 201. 7. 201. 7. 201.”

B. The second 13-14 of the judgment of the court of first instance (hereinafter “instant disposition”) is subject to the part “(hereinafter “instant disposition”)”.

(c) Forms 18 and 20 of the second decision of the first instance shall be taken in the following manner:

(1) Article 81(2) of the Enforcement Decree of the Public Property Act provides that when collecting indemnity, it shall be notified in writing clearly stating the amount, time limit for payment, place for payment, and basis for calculating indemnity. However, since the Defendant did not at all specify the specific basis for calculating indemnity, such as the value of the property at the time of the instant disposition and the rate of rent at the time of the payment notice, etc., the instant disposition based on the above payment notice, etc. is unlawful. (2) The Plaintiff’s possession of the instant land constitutes grounds for exemption from the collection of indemnity under the Public Property Act, as it constitutes the Plaintiff’s possession of the land due to inevitable reasons under Article 81(1)2 of the Public Property Act. In addition, the Defendant’s implied permission for the occupation of the instant land was granted, and thus, the instant disposition cannot be deemed to exist. (3) The instant disposition was made contrary to the public official’s promise and thus contravene the principle of trust protection.