The prosecutor's appeal is dismissed.

In light of the evidence that conforms to the facts charged in the instant case, the court below acquitted the Defendant of the facts charged in the instant case, although it can be sufficiently recognized that the Defendant’s act constitutes a force sufficient to suppress the victim’s free will. However, the court below erred by misapprehending the facts.

Judgment

A. The recognition of facts constituting an offense in a criminal trial ought to be based on strict evidence with probative value, which makes a judge not to have any reasonable doubt. As such, in a case where the prosecutor’s proof is not sufficiently enough to achieve such conviction, even if there is suspicion of guilt, such as the defendant’s assertion or defense contradictory or uncomfortable dismissal, it should be determined in the interests of the defendant (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2010Do1487, Apr. 28, 201). In addition, in light of the fact that the appellate court has the character as a follow-up trial even after it belongs to the court, and in light of the spirit of substantial direct deliberation as prescribed in the Criminal Procedure Act, it is insufficient for the first instance court to exclude a reasonable doubt after undergoing the examination of evidence, such as the examination of witness.

In a case where a not-guilty verdict is rendered on the facts charged, if it does not reach the extent that it can sufficiently resolve the reasonable doubt raised by the first instance trial even if the probability or doubt about some opposing facts may be raised as a result of the appellate trial’s examination, there is an error of mistake in the determination of facts in the first instance judgment, which lacks proof of crime solely

The lower court’s determination of the instant case is based on the evidence presented by the prosecutor alone that led to the suppression of the victim’s free will. In so doing, the lower court did not err by misapprehending the legal doctrine on freedom of expression. In so doing, the lower court did not err by misapprehending the legal doctrine on freedom of expression.