Of the first judgment, the part on Defendant B and the second judgment shall be reversed, respectively.

Defendant

B Imprisonment with prison labor for two years.

1. Summary of grounds for appeal;

A. Defendant A’s imprisonment (one year of imprisonment) is too unreasonable.

B. Defendant B’s punishment (one and half years of imprisonment with prison labor for the first instance court, and eight months of imprisonment with prison labor for the second instance court) is too unreasonable.

C. The Prosecutor’s Second Instance’s sentence is too unhued and unreasonable.

2. B, prior to the judgment on the grounds for appeal ex officio as to Defendant B’s grounds for appeal, the Prosecutor filed each appeal against the judgment of the second lower court, and decided to concurrently examine all the above appeal cases. Each of the offenses against Defendant B constitutes concurrent crimes under the former part of Article 37 of the Criminal Act, and thus, one of the offenses against Defendant B is to be sentenced within the scope of a limited term of punishment pursuant to Article 38(1) of the Criminal Act, and thus, the part against Defendant B and the judgment of the second lower court cannot be maintained any more.

3. The judgment of unfair sentencing on Defendant A’s assertion of unfair sentencing refers to cases where the sentence of the judgment of the court below is too heavy or too minor in light of the specific contents of the case.

Based on the statutory penalty, the sentencing is a discretionary judgment that takes place within a reasonable and appropriate scope by comprehensively taking into account the conditions of the sentencing prescribed in Article 51 of the Criminal Act based on the statutory penalty, and there is a unique area of the first instance court in our Criminal Procedure Act, which takes the trial-oriented principle and the direct principle.

In addition to these circumstances and the ex post facto nature of the appellate court, if there is no change in the conditions of sentencing compared to the first instance court, and the sentencing of the first instance court is not beyond the reasonable scope of discretion, it is reasonable to respect it.

(see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 2015Do3260, Jul. 23, 2015). The first instance court appears to have resulted in a crime due to the Defendant’s age and bad environment.