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(영문) 서울중앙지방법원 2016.03.10 2015노4758
건조물침입등
Text

The judgment of the court below is reversed.

Defendant shall be punished by a fine of KRW 500,000.

The above fine shall not be paid by the defendant.

Reasons

1. A summary of the grounds for appeal by the prosecutor did not occupy a new building located in Gangnam-gu Seoul Metropolitan Government E (hereinafter “instant building”) around August 4, 2014, and there was no right to possess the building.

Therefore, Article 209 (self-help) of the Civil Code cannot be applied to the defendant's act.

However, the judgment of the court below that the defendant's act of opening a assistant key into the building of this case was not unlawful due to an act permitted under Article 209 of the Civil Act.

2. Determination

A. According to the evidence duly admitted and examined by the lower court as to whether the Defendant had occupied the instant building before August 4, 2014, the lower court recognized the fact that the Defendant, prior to August 4, 2014, brought up the book, flater, clothes, flicks, etc. on or before the instant building, and that the Defendant installed a auxiliary key after changing the e-mail password, which was shared with D, the husband of the victim C and his/her female.

According to the above facts, the defendant possessed the above building before August 4, 2014.

must be viewed.

B. A person who has de facto control over an object that requires a lawful title to the Defendant to relieve himself/herself (Article 192 of the Civil Act) has a right to possess the object (Article 192 of the Civil Act). The possessor may defend, with his/her own force, his/her possession against an act of unlawfully evading or obstructing such possession (Article 209(1) of the Civil Act). If the possession of real estate has been deprived of possession, the possessor may immediately withdraw the perpetrator from his/her possession after the deprivation (Article 209(2) of the Civil Act). (2) The fact that the Defendant occupied the building of this case around August 4, 2014 is as seen earlier.

Therefore, as alleged by the prosecutor, the defendant did not have a legitimate title to possession.

Even if the defendant actually occupies the above building, it cannot be deemed that the defendant has no right to relieve himself/herself as long as he/she occupies the building.

(c)

The defendant's act is in accordance with Article 209 of the Civil Code.

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