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1. The Defendant’s notary public against C is based on the notarial deed No. 1515 of the D Deed No. 1514, May 28, 2020.
Reasons
1. On May 28, 2020, the summary of the Plaintiff’s assertion, the Defendant seized C’s corporeal movables in relation to the instant movable property at the Plaintiff’s residence, a notary public of the Republic of Korea, by using C’s No. 1515 as the title of execution of D’s No. 1515, a notary public of the Republic of Korea, as the title.
The Plaintiff is between C and C on October 31, 2018. Since the instant movable is owned by the Plaintiff as a proprietary property owned by the Plaintiff prior to marriage, compulsory execution against the instant movable is not allowed.
2. Determination
A. A lawsuit of demurrer by a third party is sought to exclude the subject matter of execution already commenced by asserting the right to block the transfer or delivery of ownership or other subject matter. The burden of proof as to the grounds for objection, i.e., the Plaintiff’s burden of proof as to whether the subject matter of execution has ownership or other rights.
On the other hand, the proprietary property owned by one spouse prior to marriage and the property acquired in one’s own name during marriage shall be presumed to be the unique property (Article 830(1) of the Civil Act). However, the property whose marital identity belongs to any one of the married couple shall be presumed to be the co-ownership of the married couple (Article 830(2) of the Civil Act). A corporeal movables owned by the debtor or jointly possessed by the spouse may be seized
(Article 190 of the Civil Execution Act).
According to the health account and evidence evidence No. 3, the fact that the plaintiff filed a marriage report only on October 31, 2018 with C and C is recognized, and considering the whole purport of the pleadings in the statement No. 2 of the evidence No. 1, 3, 5, and 9 of the attached list No. 1, 5, among the movable property of this case, all of the articles purchased by his credit card between May 21, 2016 and June 25, 2016, before the marriage with C, can be acknowledged. Accordingly, it is reasonable to deem that each of the above articles is the Plaintiff’s unique property, and otherwise, the plaintiff’s each of the above articles.