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(영문) 광주고등법원(전주) 2020.11.25 2019누1765
건축불허가처분취소
Text

1. The plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

The purport of the claim and appeal is the purport of the appeal.

Reasons

1. The reasoning of the court’s explanation concerning this case is as follows, and the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance is the same as the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance, except where a supplementary decision is made under Article 8(2) of the Administrative Litigation Act and Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act. Thus, the court’s explanation concerning this case is acceptable as it is in accordance with

The third part of the judgment of the court of first instance (hereinafter referred to as the "Ordinance of this case") in the second part of the judgment of the court of first instance (hereinafter referred to as the "Ordinance of this case") shall be construed as the "Ordinance of the Restriction on Livestock Raising of the Buan-gun (amended by Ordinance No. 2428, Feb. 18, 2019; hereinafter referred to as the "Ordinance of this case")".

2. Additional determination

A. The Plaintiff asserted that prior to the instant application, the Plaintiff leased the instant application site and completed the construction design, etc., and confirmed that it is possible to newly build a fraternity on the instant application site through the civil petition quality in the construction of the Bupyeong-Gun Office.

According to the previous Ordinance prior to the amendment of this case, the place of application of this case did not fall under the livestock breeding restriction area at the time of the application of this case.

However, while the Defendant delayed the implementation of the permission procedure with respect to the Plaintiff’s instant application without any justifiable reason, it applied the amended ordinances after a considerable period of time has elapsed from the date of application.

This infringed the Plaintiff’s trust that the previous ordinances prior to the amendment of this case were applied to the instant application due to the Defendant’s delay of the permission procedure on the Plaintiff’s instant application, and the modification of the criteria for permission, and the amended ordinances were applied unfairly retroactively. Therefore, the instant disposition was unlawful.

(b) evidence Nos. 2, 4, 8, 9, 11, 23 (if any, including a number; hereinafter the same shall apply);

(A) On April 5, 2018, the Plaintiff’s application of this case was defective and vice versa.

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