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Reasons
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(영문) 서울고등법원 2018.05.31 2018재나20002
소유권이전등기
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1. The lawsuit of this case shall be dismissed.

2. The costs of retrial shall be borne by the defendant;

purport, purport, ..

Reasons

1. Determination of the original judgment

A. On October 26, 2012, the Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the Defendant to implement the procedure for the registration of ownership transfer on the instant land due to the completion of prescriptive acquisition.

On July 13, 2016, the first instance court rendered a judgment on July 13, 2016, stating that “The Plaintiff occupied the instant land as a road from August 30, 1972 to the date when comprehensively considering the overall purport of the pleadings, comprehensively taking account of each description and image of evidence Nos. 44 and evidence Nos. 120 through 122 (including each number), the Plaintiff is presumed to have occupied the instant land as a road. The possession of the instant land is presumed to have been peaceful and openly held as his own intention. As the Plaintiff acquired the instant land by prescription, the Defendant, the owner of the instant land, at that time, is liable to implement the procedure for ownership transfer registration on the ground of the completion of the prescriptive acquisition on August 30,

(In Incheon District Court Decision 2012Gahap8313 decided July 13, 2016).B

The Defendant appealed against this and asserted that “A’s land cadastre No. 44 (Register, etc.) was forged, and the Defendant used the instant land as a rice field or dry field by 199 and constructed a building on the above land around 2003, it cannot be deemed that the Plaintiff occupied the instant land as a road.”

In light of the following circumstances, the appellate court did not recognize the defendant's assertion only with the evidence required by the defendant, but rather, considered the statement in Gap's evidence No. 120 and Gap's evidence No. 135 (the application for permission of diversion of farmland, permission of diversion of farmland, etc.) and the following circumstances, namely, the defendant himself/herself applied for permission of diversion of farmland to the neighboring land of this case on or around 2002, stating the land category of the land of this case as a road, and applied for permission of diversion of farmland to the land of this case for the same year. Thus, the land of this case was used as

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