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(영문) 대법원 1965. 11. 23. 선고 65도881 판결
[군용물분실][집13(2)형,057]
Main Issues

Whether the military supplies under Article 74 of the Military Criminal Act are limited to the military supplies of which military supplies are loaded.

Summary of Judgment

Goods subject to the crime of loss of military supplies under this Article shall not be limited to old military supplies.

[Reference Provisions]

Articles 74 and 67 of the Military Criminal Act

Appellant (military prosecutor)

Round Korea Development Bank

Escopics

Defendant

Judgment of the lower court

The Ministry of National Defense and the High Military Branch of the Second Instance of the Ministry of National Defense Act (Law No. 4, Sept. 30, 1965) decided September 30, 1965

Text

The original judgment shall be reversed, and the case shall be remanded to the High Military Council of the Ministry of National Defense.

Reasons

The prosecutor's grounds of appeal are examined.

The judgment of the court of first instance that acquitted the defendant on the same purport is just and the judgment of the court of first instance that found the defendant not guilty on the ground that the object of the crime of loss of the military supplies under Article 74 of the Military Criminal Act was not limited to the old military supplies, since the object of the crime of loss of the military supplies is limited to the old military supplies. Thus, the appeal by the court of first instance that the military prosecutor erred in the interpretation of statutes on the ground that the object of the crime of loss of the military supplies under Article 74 of the Military Supplies Act

However, Article 74 of the Military Criminal Act provides that "a person who is responsible for the custody of goods stipulated in Article 67 of the Military Criminal Act and loses such goods." Article 67 of the same Act provides that "the goods subject to the violation of the same Article shall be cited as goods stipulated in Article 67 of the same Act, and Article 67 of the same Act provides that "a person who burns an article for military use." Other goods shall be a person who sets fire and burns an article for military use." However, Article 67 of the same Act provides that "the person who sets fire and burns an article for military use." However, Article 67 of the same Act provides that "the fire and fighting of an article for military use" under Article 74 of the same Act shall be defined as a crime under Article 74 of the same Act, and Article 74 of the Military Criminal Act shall not be punished for the loss of an article unless there is a separate provision for the loss of an article for military use.

Therefore, it is clear that the original judgment had influenced the judgment by misunderstanding the legal principles of Article 74 of the Military Criminal Act, and thus, the reversal is not possible, and the arguments are reasonable.

Therefore, it is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating judges in accordance with Articles 438 and 439(2) of the Military Court Act.

Justices of the Supreme Court Dog-gu (Presiding Judge) Dog-Jak and Mag-gu Mag-gu

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