All appeals filed by prosecutors and defendants are dismissed.

1. Reasons for appeal;

A. The Prosecutor’s sentence (six months of imprisonment) is too unhued and unfair.

B. The lower court’s punishment is too unreasonable.

2. The determination of sentencing is based on statutory penalty, and the discretionary determination is made within a reasonable and reasonable scope, taking into account the factors constituting the conditions for sentencing prescribed in Article 51 of the Criminal Act.

However, considering the unique area of sentencing of sentencing of the first instance that is respected under the principle of trial priority and the principle of direct jurisdiction taken by our criminal litigation law and the nature of the ex post facto review of the appellate court, the sentencing of sentencing of the first instance was exceeded the reasonable scope of discretion when comprehensively taking into account the factors and guidelines for sentencing specified in the first instance sentencing trial process.

In light of the records newly discovered in the course of the appellate court’s sentencing hearing, it is reasonable to file an unfair judgment of the first instance court, only in cases where it is deemed unfair to maintain the sentencing of the first instance court as it is for the court to judge the sentencing of the first instance court.

In the absence of such exceptional circumstances, it is desirable to respect the first instance sentencing determination (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2015Do3260, Jul. 23, 2015). The prosecutor and the Defendant’s respective sentencing factors are reflected in the lower court, and most of them are reflected in the lower court, and there is no particular change in circumstances in the sentencing guidelines with regard to the matters subject to the conditions of sentencing after the sentence of the lower judgment.

The fact that the Defendant appears to be against the Defendant’s recognition of the instant crime, and that the Defendant was sentenced to a suspended sentence of one year and six months on May 25, 2017 due to the crime of injury resulting from escape, etc. on May 25, 2017, and the judgment became final and conclusive on June 2, 2017, and there is no particular criminal punishment other than the instant crime, and the Defendant cannot be said to have experienced difficulties in disclosing the Defendant’s non-licensed driving by the police despite the Defendant’s false statement by E.