The prosecutor's appeal is dismissed.

1. The summary of the grounds of appeal (misunderstanding of facts) is as follows: (a) the Defendant and the reference witness’s statement concerning the process of preparing the instant undertaking are inconsistent and inconsistent with each other; (b) the Defendant appears to have forged the instant undertaking in order to avoid liability on the part of E Co., Ltd. (hereinafter “E”); and (c) as the resident registration number of G on the instant undertaking is mistakenly stated, J, the son, the son of G, prepared the instant undertaking.

In full view of the fact that it is difficult to see and that there is no probative value as a result of the written appraisal by the future documentary appraiser, the Defendant’s defense that the J prepared the instant written undertaking is difficult to accept.

Nevertheless, the judgment of the court below which accepted the defendant's legal action against the defendant and acquitted the defendant of the facts charged of this case is erroneous in the misapprehension of

2. Determination

A. In full view of the following circumstances, the lower court determined that the evidence submitted by the Prosecutor, including the J’s statement, sufficient proof of the facts charged in the instant case was excluded from reasonable doubt.

Since it is judged that it cannot be easily determined, the defendant was acquitted in accordance with the latter part of Article 325 of the Criminal Procedure Act.

① The main content of the instant promise pertains to the duty to restore or compensate for damages upon the termination of the lease agreement. As such, it appears that there is no substantial difference in the content of the lease agreement made before and after the instant promise, it is difficult to find out an obvious motive for the Defendant to forge the instant promise.

A prosecutor asserts that E has forged the instant undertaking to contain in the lessor’s non-liability clause with respect to a child injury accident (the date of the accident on December 15, 2012) occurred at the leased facility of this case, but such exemption clause remains invalid in relation to a third party of the victimized person.