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(영문) 춘천지방법원 2018.05.16 2017나52303
구상금
Text

1. Of the judgment of the court of first instance, the part against the plaintiff falling under the following order for payment shall be revoked.

Reasons

1. Under the main sentence of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act, the relevant part of the reasoning of the judgment of the first instance shall be cited as to the basic facts and the Plaintiff’s assertion.

2. Determination

A. The following facts are acknowledged according to the existence of liability for damages caused by joint tort and internal apportionment ratio 1) the parties, or according to the overall purport of Gap evidence Nos. 1, 2, Eul evidence Nos. 5 and 6, and the whole arguments. (A) The plaintiff's on-site director, who has a duty of care to exercise overall control and supervision over safety issues arising during construction, etc., and the defendant A had a duty of care to operate the instant truck, as a person engaged in the instant trucking service, as a person engaged in the instant trucking service, who has a duty of care to operate the instant truck

B) At the time of the instant accident, E and Defendant A, while carrying out the PC stuff salvage work, stated to the effect that “it is difficult to secure access paths,” and, by allowing employees to 4.5 tons of PC stuffs without installing a safety bulletin, so that they exceeded the permissible tolerances by allowing employees to wear more than 4.5 tons of PC stuffs without installing a safety bulletin, and Defendant A carried out crying work exceeding the permissible tolerances. Defendant A was the Plaintiff’s employee, and Defendant A was the employee of Defendant B.

2) On the other hand, the Defendants and the Intervenor joining the Defendant (hereinafter “Defendant”) are limited to only the Defendants.

Although the accident of this case was caused exclusively by negligence of E, there was no counter-proof of the fact of this recognition.

The Defendants asserted that the Plaintiff is not Defendant B but Defendant A’s employer; however, Defendant B is the owner of the instant Lesin; according to Articles 4(2) and 8(4) of the instant lease agreement, Defendant A’s wages are paid from the instant Lesin Rental Fee that Defendant B received; and Defendant B is also the subject of replacing the Plaintiff’s driver’s license. In light of the fact that Defendant B is the subject of replacing the instant Lesin’s driver’s license, the instant lease agreement is concluded.

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