The defendant's appeal is dismissed.

1. The gist of the grounds for appeal is that the lower court’s punishment (one year and six months of imprisonment, 40 hours of orders to complete sexual assault treatment programs, 3 years of orders to disclose personal information, and 4 years of employment restrictions on children and juveniles) is too unreasonable.

2. The Criminal Procedure Act, which takes the trial-oriented principle and the direct principle, ought to respect the determination of sentencing in cases where there exists a unique area of the first instance court, and there is no change in the conditions of sentencing compared to the first instance court, and the sentencing of the first instance court does not deviate from the reasonable scope of discretion.

(See Supreme Court en banc Decision 2015Do3260 Decided July 23, 2015). There is no change in the conditions of sentencing compared with the original judgment as the new sentencing materials have not been submitted at the trial court. In full view of all the reasons for sentencing indicated in the record of the instant case, the lower court’s sentencing is too remote, and thus, cannot be deemed to have exceeded the reasonable scope of discretion.

3. The defendant's appeal is dismissed in accordance with Article 364 (4) of the Criminal Procedure Act on the grounds that the conclusion is groundless.

[However, pursuant to Article 25(1) of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the part of the lower judgment’s “for obscene acts” in the end of paragraph (1) of the same Article shall be deleted, and the part of the lower judgment’s order of employment restriction in the application of the statutes shall be understood as “the main text of Article 56(1) of the former Act on the Protection of Children and Juveniles against Sexual Abuse (amended by Act No. 15452, Mar. 13, 2018 and enforced September 14, 2018).”