The appeal is dismissed.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

The prosecutor must prove that there was a pro-enemy act under Article 7(5) of the National Security Act, and the fact that the actor was aware that he was a pro-enemy act and committed an act under Article 7(5) should not be presumed to have a pro-enemy act.

In this case, when there is no direct evidence to prove that the accused has the objective of a pro-enemy act, such indirect facts as the Defendant’s career and status, the background leading up to the Defendant to commit the act prescribed in paragraph (5) in relation to pro-enemy materials, whether the Defendant was a pro-enemy organization, the substantial goal of pro-enemy materials and activities of the pro-enemy organizations to which the Defendant belongs, may be determined by comprehensively taking into account the circumstances

(See Supreme Court en banc Decision 2010Do1189 Decided July 23, 2010 (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 2010Do1189, Jul. 23, 2010). Furthermore, the interpretation principle that the National Security Act should be applied restricted to cases where there is an obvious risk of substantial harm to the national existence and security or democratic fundamental order is also applicable to the interpretation of the act prohibited under Article 7(1) of the National Security Act (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 2003Do758, Apr. 17, 2008). The lower court determined that the Defendant was not guilty of all the charges of this case on the grounds that the Defendant, including the Defendant’s career and status, the entire contents and flow of the tweets prepared by the Defendant, and the process of preparing the tweet, cannot be deemed to have acquired or distributed the tweets listed in the attached Table 1.

The judgment of the court below.