Among the judgment of the first instance, the part against the defendant exceeding the amount ordered to be paid under the order shall be revoked.

1. The court's explanation of this part of the basic facts is the same as the pertinent part of the reasoning of the judgment of the first instance, and thus, citing it as it is by the main text of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act.

2. As to the Plaintiff’s cause of claim in the instant contract, the Defendant provided that the Plaintiff shall pay an intermediate payment of KRW 66 million (excluding value-added tax) to the Plaintiff upon completion of the permission for development activities regarding payment of the price in the instant contract, and the Plaintiff’s completion of the permission for development activities among the services stipulated in the instant contract on or around December 2015 is as seen earlier. Therefore, barring special circumstances, the Defendant is obligated to pay the Plaintiff KRW 72.6 million (=6 million value-added tax (10 million) and damages for delay.

3. Judgment on the defendant's defense, etc.

A. 1) The Defendant asserted that the instant contract was terminated or terminated due to the agreement or the Plaintiff’s default on the part of the Plaintiff’s obligation. Although the Defendant decided to complete the permission for the development of a parking lot site until September 2015, the Plaintiff obtained the said permission on December 29, 2015, the Defendant’s representative director demanded that the instant contract be terminated on or around December 2015, the Plaintiff’s representative, etc. should not be refunded the down payment already paid. The Plaintiff demanded that the instant contract be terminated, and the Plaintiff accepted the said demand with respect to the delay of the permission for development activities, and the instant contract was lawfully terminated at that time. However, the Defendant did not accept the Defendant’s assertion on the grounds that there was no evidence to acknowledge this. Furthermore, the Defendant delayed the Plaintiff’s service of the permission for development activities, and thus, the instant contract was rescinded pursuant to Article 544 of the Civil Act or Article 6(1) of the instant contract, or that the instant contract constitutes “when a person deemed to have no considerable skills to engage in technical services” under Article 6(2).

However, it is based on the delay of performance in accordance with Article 544 of the Civil Code.