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(영문) 서울고등법원 2016.10.20 2016누43178
재심판정취소 청구의 소
Text

1. The plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal, including the part arising from the supplementary participation, are all assessed against the Plaintiff.

Reasons

1. The reasoning for the court’s explanation on this part of the underlying facts is the same as that of the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance. Thus, this part of the judgment is cited in accordance with Article 8(2) of the Administrative Litigation Act and Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act

2. Whether the decision on the retrial of this case is lawful

A. The Plaintiff’s assertion 1) As to the grounds for disciplinary action of the first instance trial, the Plaintiff did not comply with the Plaintiff’s demand for return of the audit report and security contract, which is the Plaintiff’s important documents, and the Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the Plaintiff’s demand for return. Among them, the Plaintiff asserted that the audit report and security contract were sufficient to be a grounds for disciplinary action, and that the above facts should not be viewed as an independent ground for disciplinary action. Thus, the Plaintiff’s assertion as to the grounds for disciplinary action of the first instance trial does not constitute a ground for disciplinary action of the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff threatened the Plaintiff’s representative director and D managing director of the Plaintiff on January 13, 2015 in the course of the interview with D managing director of the Plaintiff and D managing director of the Plaintiff, and led the Plaintiff to a serious noise. The Intervenor’s disturbance and interference with the Plaintiff’s business was continued until January 22, 2015. The Plaintiff’s act constitutes an “unlawful act” under Article 33(1)1(1)3)7 of the Plaintiff’s penal grounds for disciplinary action.

B) The allegation on the grounds for the second disciplinary action (the first intervenor should have been reinstated on December 19, 2014, the following day after the period of the previous suspension from office expires. Despite the Plaintiff’s request for attendance, the intervenor did not send a text message to the Plaintiff’s request for the monthly stop, and ordered the Intervenor who worked on December 22, 2014 to submit a statement of reasons why the Plaintiff did not work on December 19, 2014, and submitted a statement of reasons why the intervenor did not work on December 19, 2014.

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