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(영문) 춘천지방법원 강릉지원 2020.01.09 2019노273
변호사법위반
Text

The judgment of the court below is reversed.

A defendant shall be punished by imprisonment for one year.

However, for a period of two years from the date this judgment becomes final and conclusive.

Reasons

1. Summary of grounds for appeal;

A. The Defendant, in collusion with D, who is an accomplice, received KRW 196,692,253 from E (hereinafter “E”) in return for a solicitation or good offices concerning public officials’ affairs. Since it constitutes a case where the value actually received from the accomplice cannot be known, the amount of additional collection for the instant crime should be calculated equally as KRW 98,346,126, which is divided.

B. The lower court’s sentence of unreasonable sentencing (one year of imprisonment and two years of suspended execution) is too unreasonable.

2. The purpose of Article 116 of the Attorney-at-Law Act is to prevent a person who violated Article 34 of the same Act or committed an offense under subparagraph 1 of Article 109, Article 110, Article 111, or Article 114 of the same Act, or a third party who knows such fact from being deprived of money, valuables, or other benefits received by him/her from him/her so that he/she could not retain unjust profits.

Therefore, in case where money and valuables are distributed under the pretext of solicitation for cases or affairs handled by several persons jointly, only the money and valuables actually distributed to each person should be confiscated or collected additionally.

However, in a case where multiple persons commit an offense under Article 111 of the Attorney-at-Law Act and receive money and valuables through public offering and cooperation, if it is impossible to find out the value of money and valuables actually received among accomplices due to the lack of the contents of statements among accomplices, it shall be collected equally

(see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2012Do2719, May 24, 2012). According to the evidence duly adopted and examined by the lower court, the Defendant is a de facto representative who actually runs a stock company C (hereinafter “C”), and D is a C’s business general manager who performs business affairs against government offices, etc., and the lighting organization manufacturing chain E is ESD.

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