1. The plaintiff's claim is dismissed.

2. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

1. Details of the disposition;

A. On December 10, 1995, the Plaintiff acquired a Class 2 ordinary car driving license (B). On June 25, 2015, the Plaintiff driven the car volume while under the influence of alcohol of 0.117% from blood alcohol level on June 25, 2015, and driven the car volume, and driven the Seocho-gu Seoul Seocho-gu Masan-ro into one-lane from the ebropib of the eban tunnel to the upper half of the two-lane, and led the damaged vehicle driver to see the spoke vehicle parked in the same lane on the front side of the same lane, causing the personal and physical damage for which the two-day medical treatment is required.

B. Accordingly, on August 3, 2015, the Defendant issued the instant disposition revoking the Plaintiff’s driver’s license pursuant to Article 93(1)1 of the Road Traffic Act on the ground that the Plaintiff was involved in a traffic accident while driving under influence of alcohol as above.

C. The Plaintiff filed an administrative appeal on August 10, 2015, but was dismissed on September 15, 2015.

[Reasons for Recognition] Unsatisfy, entry Nos. 4 and 14

2. Whether the disposition is lawful;

A. In light of the Plaintiff’s assertion that the Plaintiff had been aware that the alcohol would have been cut down for a considerable period of time after drinking, and that the Plaintiff was a substitute driver who had not been a substitute driver, but was moving at a short distance to a large range of way for easy delivery, the Plaintiff’s acquisition of the driver’s license and then did not have any traffic offense or any history of causing traffic accidents, and the Plaintiff had been engaged in exemplary life while serving in the community for several hundred and twenty years, the Plaintiff’s disposition in the instant case constitutes a case where the Plaintiff’s family member’s livelihood is excessive to the Plaintiff, and thus, the instant disposition constitutes a case where the Plaintiff deviates from or abused discretionary power.

B. The following circumstances, i.e., the Plaintiff’s blood alcohol concentration is the limit of permission for drunk driving under the Road Traffic Act and subordinate statutes, which can be acknowledged by comprehensively considering the respective descriptions of Nos. 8 and 9 of the plate No. 9 and the overall purport of the pleadings.