1. All appeals filed by the Defendant (Counterclaim Plaintiff, the appointed party), the appointed party, M, and N are dismissed.

2. An objection to the trial;

The court's explanation about this part of the judgment of the court of first instance as to the claim of this lawsuit is next to the 8th judgment of the court of first instance, and the 19th to 9th judgment of the court of first instance as to this part.

With the exception of amendments as stated in the judgment of the court of first instance, the grounds of the judgment of the court of first instance are as follows.

Since it is the same as the statement in the claim, it is accepted by the main sentence of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act.

3) The summary of the defendant's assertion about the defendant's assertion that the prohibition of separate disposal under the Aggregate Buildings Act applies to the seller's right to use the site for the entire site. At the time of the establishment of divided ownership of the aggregate building of this case, the South Fire-Fighting Co., Ltd. (hereinafter " South Fire-Fighting Co., Ltd.") as to all of the site

3) The right to collateral security (hereinafter “mortgage 1”) is the right to collateral security.

) The first collateral mortgage was established, and the second collateral mortgage was set up against the Asia-do Saemaul Depository (hereinafter referred to as the “second collateral mortgage”).

Around August 5, 2002, which is the time of the establishment of superficies, continue to exist and was cancelled on September 23, 2002. Therefore, since I failed to secure the right to use the site of this case around August 2002, which sold the instant aggregate building, the principle of prohibition of separate disposal does not apply. As to the whole site of this case at the time of the sale of the instant aggregate building, the registration of restriction on disposal cannot be made because the first, second and second collateral mortgages and superficies existed on the site of this case cannot be applied. The buyer voluntarily renounces his right to use the site and purchased only part of the portion of the exclusive ownership and the instant aggregate building of this case (total share of 48.96/265.5 shares). Accordingly, it cannot be deemed that the buyer or the transferee of the aggregate building acquired the right to use the site, and the plaintiffs thereafter have also registered the right to use the site only after the alteration of the right to use the site.

The right to use site and the right to use site, etc. claimed by the Defendant, etc. of the “consultation” for the instant aggregate building, shall be the right to use site.