The prosecutor's appeal is dismissed.

1. The gist of the grounds for appeal is that the defendant is a person who manages personal information, and the defendant's act using personal information for election campaign constitutes the use of personal information exceeding the scope of the purpose of collection.

2. Determination

A. Under the General Rule of Chapter I, the Personal Information Protection Act defines a personal information manager as “a public institution, corporation, organization, individual, etc. that processes personal information on its own or through another person to operate a personal information file for the purpose of performing his/her duties” (Article 2 subparag. 5), and provides for the collection and use of personal information of a personal information manager (Article 15), restrictions on the collection and use of personal information (Article 16), restrictions on the provision and use of personal information for purposes other than the purpose of providing and providing personal information (Articles 17, 18), restrictions on the management of personal information (Articles 23 and 24), etc. As such, Article 15(1) of the Personal Information Protection Act provides that a person who manages personal information may collect and use such personal information within the scope of the purpose of collecting such information in any of the following cases (Article 15).

1. Where the consent is obtained from the subject of information;

2. Where special provisions exist in any Act or it is inevitable to comply with legal obligations;

3. Where it is inevitable for public institutions to perform duties prescribed by statutes, etc.

4. Where it is inevitably necessary to conclude and perform a contract with a subject of information;

5. The life, body and property of an owner of information or a third party, where the owner of information or his/her legal representative is unable to express his/her intent or it is clearly impossible to obtain prior consent due to unknown addresses, etc.