Defendant

All appeals filed by E, G, and I against the Defendant A, B, C, D, F, I, J, K, andO of the Prosecutor are dismissed.

1. Summary of grounds for appeal;

A. Defendant E, G, and I’s punishment (Defendant E: Imprisonment with prison labor for one year and six months; imprisonment for eight months; imprisonment for two years; imprisonment for two years; imprisonment for two years; imprisonment for two years; imprisonment for two years and six months; and order of community service for three years and 120 hours) is too unreasonable.

B. According to the prosecutor’s evidence submitted by the prosecutor with respect to Defendant F, although it can be acknowledged that Defendant F placed an advertisement in a manner prohibited by the Food Sanitation Act, the lower court acquitted Defendant F of this part of the facts charged, it erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine.

2) Defendant A, B, C, D, I, J, K, andO are deemed to have been sentenced to imprisonment for two years and six months, to have been sentenced to suspension of execution for three years and 120 hours, to have been sentenced to imprisonment for four years, to have been sentenced to suspension of execution for four years, to have been sentenced to community service order and confiscation for 160 hours, to have been sentenced to imprisonment for two years, to have been sentenced to suspension of execution for three years and 120 hours, to have been sentenced to community service order, Defendant I, and J: imprisonment for two years and six months, to have been sentenced to suspension of execution for three years and 120 hours, to have been sentenced to community service order, Defendant K, andO for one year and six months, and to have been sentenced to suspension of execution for two years).

2. Determination

A. It is reasonable to respect the sentencing conditions in comparison with the first instance court’s judgment on the unfair argument of sentencing by Defendant E and G where there is no change in the conditions of sentencing, and the sentencing by the first instance court does not deviate from the reasonable scope of discretion. Although the sentence of sentencing by the first instance court falls within the reasonable scope of discretion, it is desirable to refrain from rendering a sentence that is not different from the first instance court’s opinion (see Supreme Court Decision 2015Do3260, Jul. 23, 2015) by destroying the first instance judgment on the sole ground that the sentence of sentencing by the first instance court falls within the reasonable scope of discretion, but is somewhat different from the appellate court’s opinion (see Supreme Court Decision 2015Do3260, Jul. 23, 2015). In light of the foregoing legal principles, there is no change in the sentencing conditions compared with the lower court’s opinion, and in full view of the reasons for sentencing presented by the lower court, the sentence by the lower court is adequate and too unfair.