The appeal is dismissed.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

Article 3(1)16(b) of the Foreign Exchange Transactions Act provides that “collection and receipt of payment between the Republic of Korea and a foreign country” and Article 3(1)6(e) of the same Act provides that “business similar to the above item(b) and other business prescribed by Presidential Decree” shall be “foreign exchange business” and Article 6 subparag. 4 of the Enforcement Decree of the Foreign Exchange Transactions Act provides that “business incidental to the business referred to in Article 3(1)16(b) of the Foreign Exchange Transactions Act” shall fall under “business prescribed by Presidential Decree”.

Therefore, the incidental business directly necessary and closely related to “payment, collection and receipt between the Republic of Korea and a foreign country” constitutes foreign exchange business under Article 3(1)16(e) of the Foreign Exchange Transactions Act (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2005Do1603, May 8, 2008). The lower court found the Defendant guilty of the facts charged of the instant case on the following grounds.

In other words, as long as a series of acts by the Defendant, etc., including preparing and transporting foreign currency KRW 1 billion, constitute foreign exchange business under Article 3(1)16(e) of the Foreign Exchange Transactions Act as an incidental business directly necessary and closely related to “collection and receipt of payment between the Republic of Korea and a foreign country”, it constitutes a violation of the Foreign Exchange Transactions Act due to unregistered foreign exchange business. Even if the facts of the Defendant, etc. were the intent to forcibly take the fluentization without the intention to remit the above bill, and was taking the action without paying the above bill.

Even if it does not affect the establishment of the instant crime, it does not affect the establishment thereof.

The judgment below

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the aforementioned legal doctrine and the evidence duly admitted by the first instance court, the lower court did not err in its judgment by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence against logical and empirical rules, contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal.

Other grounds for appeal by the defendant are not legitimate grounds for appeal under Article 383 of the Criminal Procedure Act.

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed.