The defendant's appeal is dismissed.

1. The summary of the grounds for appeal (one year and six months of imprisonment, 40 hours of order to complete a sexual assault treatment program, 5 years of employment restriction order) declared by the court below is too unreasonable.

2. The Criminal Procedure Act, which takes the trial-oriented principle and the direct principle on the Defendant’s assertion of unfair sentencing, has the inherent area of sentencing determination in the first instance court. As such, in a case where there is no change in the conditions of sentencing compared to the first instance court, and the sentencing of the first instance court does not deviate from the reasonable scope of discretion

(See Supreme Court en banc Decision 2015Do3260 Decided July 23, 2015). In full view of the following legal principles, the lower court’s sentencing is too excessive and thus, cannot be deemed to have exceeded the reasonable scope of discretion by comprehensively taking account of the following: (a) the Defendant’s favorable circumstances; (b) the Defendant committed an indecent act against unspecified women; (c) the Defendant repeated the indecent act against an unspecified female; (d) the Defendant was punished once by larceny; (d) the Defendant has been punished once a suspended sentence; (e) the Defendant did not submit new sentencing data in the trial; and (e) there was no change in the sentencing conditions compared with the lower court’s argument; and (e) other factors revealed in the proceedings of the instant case.

Therefore, the defendant's assertion is not accepted.

3. Based on its stated reasoning, the lower court found the Defendant guilty of both the crime of indecent act by force and other crime of fraud, etc. subject to registration, and sentenced a single imprisonment on the ground that each of the above crimes constitutes concurrent crimes under the former part of Article 37 of the Criminal Act.

However, since Article 45(4) of the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Punishment, etc. of Sexual Crimes is applied to this case, whether it is unreasonable to determine the period of registration of personal information against the defendant under each subparagraph of Article 45(1).