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(영문) 서울고등법원 2016.03.24 2015나2045329
구상금등
Text

1. All appeals filed by the plaintiff and the defendant are dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by each party.

Purport of claim and appeal

(b).

Reasons

The reasoning for the court's explanation of this case is as stated in the reasoning of the judgment of the first instance, which excludes or excludes any dismissal or addition under the judgment of the first instance among the judgment of the court of first instance, and therefore, it is accepted in accordance with the main sentence of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act. The fourth or additional part of the fourth part of the report cannot be deemed to have lost "(the defendant cannot be deemed to have lost" (the above act of G from the news report materials about housing reconstruction association in Seoul Special Metropolitan City is presented as one of the improper operational status of the housing reconstruction association's housing reconstruction association, and therefore, the above act of G is alleged to fall under "an act," such as "an act, which is a ground for suspending the qualification for officer's performance of duty as prescribed in Article 13 (2) of the articles of incorporation of the plaintiff," and if in light of the text and purport of the articles of incorporation of the plaintiff as seen above, it cannot be accepted by the defendant's assertion that the above act of G constitutes "an act" as stated in Article 13 (2).

A. The first instance court held that “A person liable to pay acquisition tax is the Defendant,” and “A person liable to pay acquisition tax is the Defendant, and even if so, Article 3(1) of the sales contract of this case is clear that the person liable to pay acquisition tax on the commercial buildings of this case is the Defendant, as seen earlier.”

A. The 12th to 6th of the 12th day shall be accused as follows.

P. The Plaintiff’s above assertion is without merit. Furthermore, the Plaintiff’s consent to the use of property at around November 2009 or the confirmation of the granting of the right to use commercial buildings at around March 2010 (No. 2) constitutes an act that the Plaintiff’s representative for the president of the partnership did not belong to the corporation’s ordinary business without the permission of the court, and the Defendant is aware of this fact in advance.

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