1. Revocation of the first instance judgment.

2. The plaintiff's claim is dismissed.

3. All costs of the lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

1. Determination as to the cause of claim

A. Comprehensively taking account of the purport of the entire arguments as to Gap evidence Nos. 1 and 2, it is recognized that on June 23, 2006, the defendant prepared and delivered a letter of loan stating that "the defendant borrowed KRW 11.5 million from the plaintiff in relation to the credit transaction obligation in the entertainment tavern in Seo-gu Seoul, Seo-gu, Seoul, operated by the plaintiff on June 23, 2006."

B. According to the above facts, it is reasonable to view that the Plaintiff and the Defendant entered into a quasi-loan contract for consumption under Article 6505 of the Civil Act, the purpose of which is to loan for consumption on June 23, 2006 (hereinafter “quasi-loan contract for consumption”). Thus, barring any special circumstance, the Defendant is obliged to pay the loan amount of KRW 11.5 million to the Plaintiff and its delay damages.

2. Judgment on the defendant's defense

A. At the time of the application for the payment order of this case, the defendant defense that the loan claim under the quasi-loan loan contract of this case expired due to the expiration of the extinctive prescription under Article 162 (1) of the Civil Code after the lapse of ten years from the due

B. (1) Even in case of credit transaction claims subject to the short-term extinctive prescription under Article 163 subparagraph 6 of the Civil Act, as seen earlier, it is reasonable to presume that the instant quasi-loan contract was concluded between the Plaintiff and the Defendant, as seen earlier, and the said quasi-loan contract was concluded as a commercial activity conducted by the Plaintiff for its business operations. Accordingly, a claim for a loan under the said quasi-loan contract against the Plaintiff’s Defendant, which was newly incurred therefrom, is subject to the application of the five-year commercial extinctive prescription (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 80Da1363, Dec. 22, 1981) (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 80Da1363, Dec. 22, 1981). The argument on how the extinctive prescription period of a certain right becomes applicable is merely a mere legal assertion, and thus, the court may determine ex officio thereon (see Supreme Court Decision 200