The defendant's appeal is dismissed.

1. The summary of the grounds for appeal (e.g., imprisonment with prison labor for one year and six months) of the lower court is too unreasonable.

2. The determination of sentencing is based on the statutory penalty, with a discretionary determination that takes place within a reasonable and appropriate scope, taking into account the factors constituting the conditions for sentencing prescribed in Article 51 of the Criminal Act, based on which our Criminal Procedure Act, which takes the trial-oriented principle and the principle of directness, has a unique area of the first instance trial regarding the

In addition, considering these circumstances and the ex post facto nature of the appellate court, it is reasonable to respect the sentencing conditions in the event that there is no change in the conditions of sentencing compared with the first instance court, and the sentencing of the first instance court does not deviate from the reasonable scope of discretion, and to refrain from rendering a sentence that does not differ from the first instance court on the sole ground that the sentence of the first instance falls within the reasonable scope of discretion, even though the sentence of the first instance court is somewhat different from the opinion of the appellate court.

(See Supreme Court en banc Decision 2015Do3260 Decided July 23, 2015). The lower court, based on its stated reasoning, sentenced the Defendant to the said punishment.

The circumstances cited by the defendant as the reasons for appeal are the factors that have already been determined by the original court and sufficiently taken into account, and there is no circumstance that can be specially considered in the trial, and there is no change in the conditions of sentencing.

Specifically, there are some favorable circumstances, such as the fact that the defendant acknowledges and reflects his mistake, the fact that the defendant does not drive under the influence of alcohol again, and the fact that the vehicle has been scrapped.

However, even though the Defendant had been already punished two times or more due to drinking driving (one time of actual punishment and one time of suspended sentence of imprisonment), it is difficult to see that the Defendant committed the instant crime again, and it is also difficult to see that there was a good mind about the risk of recidivism.

At the time of driving under the influence of alcohol in this case, the blood alcohol concentration was very high to 0.210%, and the driving under the influence of alcohol was made.