1. Revocation of the first instance judgment.

2. The plaintiff's claim is dismissed.

3. All costs of the lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

1. Determination as to the cause of claim

A. A. The fact that the Plaintiff lent KRW 13,00,000 to the Defendant around January 1, 1997 that the Plaintiff lent KRW 13,00,000 to the Defendant around January 1, 1997 does not conflict between the parties.

The plaintiff asserts that he agreed on January 9, 1998 at the time of the above lending, but there is no evidence to acknowledge this.

B. According to the evidence No. 2-2 of the loan No. 10,000,000 won around July 9, 1997, the Defendant issued a promissory note with the face value of KRW 10,000,000 and the payee D on July 9, 1997. However, the above evidence alone is insufficient to recognize that the Plaintiff lent KRW 10,00,000 to the Defendant on the issuance date of the said promissory note.

C. In full view of the statement of No. 2-1 of the loan No. 17,00,000 won and the purport of the whole pleadings around October 30, 1997, the plaintiff extended KRW 17,000,000 to the defendant around October 30, 1997.

Thus, the defendant is obligated to pay the plaintiff the loan of KRW 30,000,000 ( KRW 13,000,000) and the delay damages for the loan.

2. Extinctive prescription;

A. The defendant asserts that each of the above loans claim has expired by prescription.

Since there is no evidence that the plaintiff and the defendant have determined the due date at the time of each lending set forth in paragraph 1(a) and (c), each of the above loans claims will begin with the expiration date.

It is clear that the lawsuit of this case was filed after the lapse of ten years from the initial date of extinctive prescription (for the KRW 13 million, April 30, 1997; for the KRW 17 million, December 30, 1997) claimed by the Defendant, as of each lease date or thereafter.

Ultimately, since each of the above loans claim has expired by prescription before the instant lawsuit was filed, the defendant's assertion is reasonable.

B. As to this, the Plaintiff’s assertion that the extinctive prescription has been interrupted because he received interest on each of the above loans from the Defendant around A, 2003, but the Plaintiff’s testimony by the witness E at the trial alone is the same.