The prosecutor's appeal is dismissed.

1. In light of the benefits that the Defendant would take part in the insurance fraud crime of this case, and the changes in the Defendant’s attitude after the traffic accident stated in the facts charged, it is recognized that the Defendant committed the insurance fraud crime of this case in collusion with Co-Defendant B and C of the lower judgment (hereinafter “instant insurance fraud crime”).

2. The recognition of facts constituting an offense in a criminal trial ought to be based on strict evidence with probative value, which makes a judge not to have any reasonable doubt. Thus, in a case where the prosecutor’s proof fails to fully reach the extent that the defendant’s assertion or defense is inconsistent or unreasonable, it should be determined in the interests of the defendant even if there is suspicion of guilt, such as where the defendant’s assertion or defense is inconsistent or unreasonable.

(see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2010Do14487, Apr. 28, 2011). In addition, in a case where the first instance court rendered a judgment not guilty of the facts charged on the ground that there is insufficient evidence to exclude reasonable doubt after undergoing the examination of evidence, such as the examination of witness, in light of the fact that the criminal appellate court has the character as a post-trial trial even after deceiving the Defendant, and the spirit of substantial direct cross-examination under the Criminal Procedure Act, etc., the first instance court may raise probability or doubt as to the facts that

Even if it does not reach the extent of sufficiently resolving the reasonable doubt caused by the first instance trial, such circumstance alone alone alone does not readily conclude that there was an error of misunderstanding of facts in the judgment of the first instance court that lack of proof of crime (see Supreme Court Decision 2015Do11428, Feb. 18, 2016). In full view of the circumstances in the judgment, the lower court should not recognize the Defendant as guilty of the facts charged by deeming that the evidence submitted by the prosecutor alone is co-defendant B and C.