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(영문) 서울동부지방법원 2019.07.05 2017나23037
보증금반환
Text

1. The plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.

2. The appeal cost (including the cost of participation) shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

Reasons

1. The reasoning of the judgment of this court citing the judgment of the court of first instance is as follows, except for the following determination as to the assertion added or emphasized by the plaintiff in this court, and thus, it is acceptable in accordance with the main sentence of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act.

2. Determination as to whether there was an agreement to guarantee exclusive profits

A. Upon entering into the instant lease agreement, the Plaintiff’s assertion C promised to make the Plaintiff operate a single member exclusively from the instant building, and thereafter, only one member of the instant building was occupied.

Therefore, the Plaintiff’s rescission or termination of the instant lease agreement on the ground of the nonperformance of the foregoing agreement, or on the ground of deception or mistake in important part, and sought a refund of the lease deposit amount of KRW 70,000,000 and damages for delay from November 12, 2014, for which the instant lease agreement was concluded, to the Defendant who succeeded to the lessor status of the instant lease agreement.

B. Determination Gap evidence Nos. 5, 7, 17, 18, 25, 55, 57, and Eul evidence Nos. 1, Eul evidence Nos. 1, Eul Nos. 1, 2, and 3 (including paper numbers), and the following circumstances, which can be acknowledged by comprehensively taking into account the witness N of the first instance court, Eul’s testimony, witness P, and Q’s testimony, and the overall purport of the pleadings, there was an agreement to guarantee exclusive profits when concluding the instant lease agreement.

It is difficult to view that the exclusive interest guarantee was the content of the instant lease agreement, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge it.

Therefore, the Plaintiff’s assertion is without merit, under the premise that the right to exclusively operate only one member in the instant building was guaranteed when concluding the instant lease agreement.

(1) On August 28, 2015 after the conclusion of the instant lease agreement, the Plaintiff stated that “I will proceed again with the National Assembly President of the Sale and Lease Agency, due to the circumstances, with the employees of the Plaintiff.”

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