1. Of the judgment of the court of first instance, the part against the defendant in excess of the following amount ordered to be paid shall be revoked.

1. If a copy of the complaint, original copy, etc. of the judgment were served by means of service by public notice, barring any special circumstance, the defendant was unaware of the service of the judgment without negligence, and in such a case, the defendant was unable to comply with the peremptory period due to a cause not attributable to him/her and thus, he/she is entitled to file an appeal for subsequent appeal within two weeks after such cause ceases to exist

Here, the term “after the cause has ceased” refers to the time when a party or legal representative becomes aware of the fact that the judgment was rendered by public notice, rather than the time when the party or legal representative becomes aware of the fact that the judgment was served by public notice. Thus, barring any special circumstances, it shall be deemed that the party or legal representative becomes aware of the fact that the judgment was served by public notice only when he/she

(see, etc.). The court of first instance rendered a judgment that fully accepts a claim against the Defendant on July 18, 2017, by serving a copy of the complaint and the notice of the date for pleading by public notice, on January 10, 2013 (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2010Da75044, 75051). The fact that the original copy of the judgment was served on the Defendant on July 26, 2017 by means of service by public notice, and that the Defendant was aware of the fact that the original copy of the judgment was issued on March 18, 2019 and the Defendant was served on the Defendant by means of service by public notice, and that the first instance judgment was submitted on March 20, 2019.

According to the above facts, the defendant was unable to observe the peremptory appeal period due to a cause not attributable to the defendant, and filed a subsequent appeal within two weeks from the time the cause ceases to exist. Thus, the subsequent appeal of this case is lawful.

2. Basic facts

A. On April 2016, the Plaintiff entered into a car siren agreement with the Defendant and entered into a transaction with the said Defendant, and on April 2016, the Plaintiff was the Defendant benc 220d (D) automobile (hereinafter “instant automobile”).