1. Revocation of the first instance judgment.

2. The plaintiff's claims against the defendants are all dismissed.

3. The total cost of the lawsuit.

1. Determination on this safety defense

A. Since the Plaintiff’s assertion in Defendant B had been engaged in daily business with Defendant C, the part concerning Defendant B among the Plaintiff’s lawsuit in this case against a person who is not a party to the lawsuit must be dismissed.

B. In a lawsuit for performance of judgment, the standing to be the defendant is the plaintiff's own claim and the judgment is absorptioned into the judgment of the propriety of the claim, and thus the person alleged as the claimant is the defendant (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 95Da18451, Nov. 28, 1995). The lawsuit in this case constitutes a performance suit and the defendant B asserted as the performance obligor is the defendant's standing to be the defendant.

Therefore, Defendant B’s above defense of safety is without merit.

2. The Plaintiff, who runs a wholesale and retail business, supplied the Defendants, who run food and beverage sales business, with a task equivalent to KRW 2,810,000,000 from January 25, 2005 to December 27, 2007. The Defendants paid only KRW 11,50,000 out of the purchase price from December 30, 206 to December 5, 2014.

Therefore, the Defendants should jointly and severally pay to the Plaintiff KRW 16.6 million (=28.1 million - KRW 1.5 million).

3. On the basis of the judgment, the evidence submitted by the Plaintiff alone is insufficient to acknowledge that the Plaintiff has a claim for the purchase price of KRW 16.6 million against the Defendants, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge this otherwise. As otherwise alleged by the Plaintiff, even if the Plaintiff had a claim against the Defendants, the above claim for the purchase price constitutes a price for products and goods sold by the producer and merchant, and thus, is not exercised for three years pursuant to Article 163 subparagraph 6 of the Civil Act, and the extinctive prescription expires due to the Plaintiff’s failure to exercise it for three years pursuant to Article 163 subparagraph 6 of the Civil Act. According to each of the evidence evidence Nos. 1, 3, and 1, it is recognized that the Plaintiff supplied the Defendants with an excessive work by February 7, 2005, and the Plaintiff supplied the Defendants by December 26, 2016 thereafter.