1. Of the judgment of the court of first instance, the part against the defendant exceeding the following amount ordered to be paid shall be revoked.
1. The reasoning for this part of the basic facts is the same as that of the corresponding column of the judgment of the court of first instance.
2. As to the claim for return of loan (as to KRW 200 million, the primary claim); and
A. 1) The parties’ assertion 1) The amount of KRW 37.67 million remitted to the Defendant’s claim account and KRW 110,767 million transferred to the Defendant’s actual operator D’s account in the name of E, and KRW 417.67 million in total, are all loans to the Defendant. As such, the Defendant is obligated to pay the Plaintiff KRW 417.67 million and the damages for delay from March 1, 2017, after the due date specified in the instant content certification, to the Plaintiff. 2) The amount of KRW 200 million out of the amount of KRW 37.67 million remitted to the Defendant’s claim account is the deposit money in the instant case, and KRW 10,000,000,000 transferred to the Defendant’s account in the name of E is the Plaintiff’s loan to E.
Therefore, the part of the plaintiff's claim about KRW 310 million is unreasonable.
B. Determination 1) Of the money transferred to the Defendant account by the Plaintiff to the Defendant account, the fact that KRW 17.67 million was a loan to the Defendant is no dispute between the parties. However, even if all the evidence submitted to this court were collected, it is difficult to view that the Plaintiff lent the remainder of KRW 200 million to the Defendant, and there is no other sufficient evidence to acknowledge it. Rather, according to the purport of the written evidence No. 4 and the oral argument, the lease contract of this case states that the deposit amount shall be KRW 20 million at the time of the contract, the remainder of KRW 100 million shall be paid on September 4, 2015, and the content certification of this case also stated that KRW 20 million was a lease deposit, and that the Plaintiff was engaged in the Vice General business until January 24, 2017. In light of this, it is reasonable to view the Plaintiff as the deposit amount within the scope of the Plaintiff’s account in the name of the Vice General.