1. The Defendant’s KRW 91,50,000 as well as the Plaintiff’s annual rate of KRW 5% from April 5, 2019 to May 24, 2019 and May 25, 2019.

1. In light of the facts of recognition as evidence Nos. 1 through 6 (including the number of branch numbers), the Plaintiff loaned a total of KRW 91,500,000 to the Defendant, as shown in the separate sheet, as shown in the separate sheet, from March 4, 2017 to September 30, 2017, who is a female’s father who promised marriage at the time, without setting the maturity period, interest rate, etc.

2. Examining the above facts of recognition in light of the legal principles seen below, the Defendant is obligated to pay to the Plaintiff damages for delay at each rate of KRW 91,50,000 and KRW 15% per annum as prescribed by the Civil Act from April 5, 2019, which is the date of the closing of argument in this case, to May 24, 2019, the date of the imposition of a substantial amount of dispute as to the existence and scope of the Defendant’s duty to perform as to the Plaintiff.

① The Plaintiff filed a claim for the payment of damages for delay from October 1, 2017, which is the day following the final lease date. However, in a loan for consumption where no time of repayment is fixed, the Plaintiff may serve the peremptory notice of its return as a written complaint. If a considerable period from that time to the date of the closing of argument has elapsed, the borrower shall be held liable for delay from April 5, 2019, in light of all the circumstances, including the legal doctrine that he/she loses his/her right to defense (see, e.g., Article 603(2) of the Civil Act and Supreme Court Decision 63Da131, May 9, 1963) and the period between the delivery date of the written complaint and the date of closing of argument, and the amount of loans, etc., the Defendant shall be held liable

② If the first instance court accepted only a part of the Plaintiff’s claim and dismissed the remainder of the claim in a lawsuit seeking monetary payment, the Defendant, barring any special circumstance, is deemed reasonable to resist the existence or scope of the obligation until the judgment of the first instance is rendered, and thus, the damages for delay in relation to the cited amount shall be determined by the judgment of the first instance.