In a case where the appellate court dismisses an appeal for the reason that the appeal has no reason to appeal, whether a regular sentence may be imposed against the defendant who has reached the majority at the time of a decision of the appellate court.

In spite of the fact that the appellate court has attained majority at the time of sentence, it is erroneous to dismiss an appeal by citing the judgment of the first instance which sentenced an irregular sentence without a regular sentence.

Article 2 of the Juvenile Act, Article 54(1) of the Juvenile Act, Article 364(5) of the Criminal Procedure Act, Article 366 of the Criminal Procedure Act

Supreme Court Decision 65Do498 Decided November 10, 1964

Defendant

Seoul Criminal District Court Decision 65No1605 delivered on December 9, 1965

The original judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Panel Division of the Seoul Criminal Court.

As to the ground of appeal No. 1

On December 9, 1945, the original judgment recognized the date of birth of the defendant as the date of birth of the defendant on November 25, 1945, and sentenced the dismissal on December 9, 1965 (as a result of the reply of the chief of the Public Security Investigation Department of the Ministry of Home Affairs to inquire into each fingerprint in the last 44 copies of the records and the last 44 copies of the records, the statement is recorded as the birth of the defendant in October 1947). The original judgment cited the

However, if the date of birth of the defendant is the same as the original judgment recognized on November 25, 1945, the defendant in December 9, 1965, which was at the time when the original judgment was sentenced, should have been sentenced to a regular sentence, since he is an adult, the original judgment should have dismissed the appeal and accepted the first instance judgment which sentenced the imprisonment for a short term of April 10, under the Juvenile Act (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 64Do498, Nov. 10, 1964). Therefore, the original judgment cannot be reversed without requiring any judgment on other issues.

Therefore, under Article 397 of the Criminal Procedure Act, there is a dissenting opinion by the judge of the Supreme Court as follows, except for the dissenting opinion by the Han Sung and Hong-ran. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating

The dissenting opinion of the judge of the Supreme Court is as follows.

The purpose of the current appellate court's structure is, in principle, to examine whether the judgment of the court of first instance is a party of the judgment and to examine the illegality, and it is not a case where the appellate court reverses the judgment of the court of first instance, but a case where the appellate court rejects an appeal on the ground that there is no reason for appeal, or where the appellate court reverses the judgment of the court of first instance and returns or transfers it pursuant to Article 366 of the Criminal Procedure Act, the appellate court's nature shall be the right ex post facto judgment. Therefore, in principle, in this ex post facto review, the appellate court's judgment should be determined at the time of the judgment of first instance, and there is a abolition, alteration, or amnesty after the judgment. Thus, if there is a explicit provision, the facts after the judgment of the court of first instance or the amendment of statutes after the judgment of the court of first instance,

According to the records, the appellate court, which recognized the theft by the defendant and sentenced the non-guilty sentence for a period of April and August of the short term, did not recognize that the defendant was the ground for appeal that there was misconception of the crime and the ground for unfair sentencing. In this case, the appellate court dismissed the appeal and examined it later. (The ground that a minor at the time of the judgment of the first instance was an adult at the time of the judgment does not constitute the ground for reversal under Article 361-5 of the Criminal Procedure Act. Thus, the appellate court cannot reverse the judgment of the first instance only on the ground that the ground of the above ground does not constitute the ground for reversal.) The appellate court's ruling of the first instance does not constitute a ground for exception as described above, except in the case of an express case as described above. In other words, the propriety of the application of the Juvenile Act should also be determined at the time of the judgment of the appellate court as to whether the defendant is an adult or not, and therefore, it should be determined at the time of the judgment of the appellate court as a standard at the time of the judgment of the first instance.

Supreme Court Judge Yang-Gyeong-Gyeong (Presiding Judge) (Presiding Judge) Gyeong-do and Kim Dong-dong and Kimchi-bak, so-called the maximum luxle lusium lusty lusty lusty lusty lus