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(영문) 춘천지방법원 2016.06.30 2015노1075
특수협박등
Text

The judgment below

Part concerning Defendant A and B shall be reversed.

Defendant

A and B shall be punished by imprisonment for eight months.

(2).

Reasons

1. The gist of the grounds for appeal is that the lower court’s punishment (the 8 months of imprisonment for each of the Defendant A and B, the 2 years of suspended execution, the observation of each of the protection, the order to attend a lecture for violent treatment of 40 hours, and the 5 million won of each of the Defendant C’s fine) is too uneasible and unreasonable.

2. We examine ex officio prior to the judgment on the grounds for ex officio appeal.

In the trial of the party, the prosecutor applied the applicable law to “special intimidation” as the name of the crime against Defendant A and B in violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act (a group, deadly weapon, etc.) and “Article 3(1), Article 2(1)1, and Article 283(1) of the Criminal Act” to “Article 284 and Article 283(1) of the Criminal Act,” respectively, and the court granted permission.

Therefore, the subject of the judgment was changed and the part of the judgment of the court below on the defendant A and B cannot be maintained.

3. It is desirable to refrain from imposing a sentence that does not differ from the first instance court’s judgment on the grounds for appeal against Defendant C by the public prosecutor (Supreme Court Decision 2015Do3260 Decided July 23, 2015) by destroying the first instance judgment solely on the ground that the first instance judgment is somewhat different from the appellate court’s opinion, even though the first instance judgment does not change the conditions of sentencing compared with the first instance court’s judgment on the grounds for appeal against Defendant C, and the first instance judgment does not deviate from the reasonable scope of discretion. In light of the above legal principles, it is not recognized that there was no change in the conditions of sentencing compared with the lower court’s judgment on the grounds that new materials for sentencing were not submitted in the first instance court, and that the sentencing of the lower court is too unreasonable, and thus, it is not recognized that the sentencing of the lower court exceeded the reasonable scope of discretion, considering all the reasons for sentencing presented by the lower court.

4. In conclusion, the Prosecutor’s appeal against Defendant C is dismissed in accordance with Article 364(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act on the grounds that the appeal against Defendant C is groundless, and the part of the lower judgment against Defendant A and B is seen above.

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