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(영문) 서울서부지방법원 2017.12.19 2017나34138
구상금
Text

1. The plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

Purport of claim and appeal

Judgment of the first instance.

Reasons

1. The reasons for the acceptance of the judgment of the court of first instance are the reasons for the judgment of the court of first instance except for the following "2. height", and thus, they are quoted by the main sentence of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act.

(However, the part on Defendant A and B Co., Ltd. in the first instance court, which is separate and confirmed, is excluded)

2. The height of the judgment of the court of first instance shall be 3 to 11 parallels in the 8th judgment as follows:

In light of the duty of multiple lessees as joint and several liability (Article 654 and Article 616 of the Civil Act) and the fact that, in cases where a co-owner of a real estate jointly leases a real estate, the obligation to return the deposit is indivisible (see Supreme Court Decision 98Da43137, Dec. 8, 1998), barring any special circumstance, it is reasonable to deem that the claim for the return of deposit for lease of a co-leased is an indivisible claim in its nature or in accordance with the agreement between the parties. In cases of an indivisible claim, the obligor may discharge

(Article 409 of the Civil Act). Meanwhile, in order to constitute a fraudulent act, a fraudulent act refers to an act detrimental to the creditor by causing the debtor to go beyond his/her obligation by reducing active property or increasing his/her negative property, or by deepening the creditor’s status in excess of his/her obligation, it should be premised on the fact that such act resulted in the above situation.

(See Supreme Court Decision 200Da7783 Decided October 25, 2002, etc.). In light of the aforementioned legal principles, the following circumstances are as follows, which are acknowledged by comprehensively considering the following: (a) the health stand in this case; (b) the facts of recognition as seen earlier; and (c) the overall purport of the entries and arguments in Gap 5-1, 2, Eul 3-1 through 4, and Eul 13 through 15; (b) the Defendant paid the lease deposit of KRW 180 million to E on March 30, 2013; (c) the Defendant leased the instant apartment and entered into a lease agreement as of June 6, 2014, stating “B” in the lessee column, but (d) the person who was the representative director at the time A; and (e) the person who was the representative director at the time.

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