The appeal is dismissed.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. As to the grounds of appeal on intimidation against electors, “Interference with the freedom of election” under Article 237(1)1 of the Public Official Election Act is established when an act of threatening an elector, election campaign manager, etc. is committed regarding an election.

Here, “Voting” includes not only persons registered in the electoral register or the electoral register but also persons eligible to be recorded in the electoral register, etc. before preparing the electoral register or the electoral register, etc.

(See Articles 3, 218-10(1) and 230(1)1 of the Public Official Election Act (see, e.g., Articles 3, 218-10(1) and 230(1)1 of the same Act). “Election” means “a motive for matters concerning an election, such as voting, election, election, or election, in a specific election.” The subjective constituent elements of “Interference with the freedom of election” include not only the object of the act, but also the perception that “election” is “election” with the awareness

(See Supreme Court Decision 2006Do5019 Decided November 23, 2006, etc.). The lower court upheld the first instance judgment that acquitted the Defendant on the ground that this part of the facts charged constitutes a case where there is no proof of criminal facts, and thus, it is difficult to view that G did not constitute an elector under the Public Official Election Act, and that it is difficult to deem that the Defendant made intimidation against G, with the intent of infringing on the freedom of voting activities, etc. held by the elector.

However, according to the relevant laws and records, G is an elector eligible for entry in the 18th presidential election register.

In light of the above provisions of the Public Official Election Act, G is the Public Official Election Act.