The prosecutor's appeal is dismissed.

1. According to the evidence submitted by the prosecutor, the fact that the defendant restored the land as indicated in the judgment of the court below (hereinafter “instant land”) which was actually used as miscellaneous land until June 2013 to restore it to normal farmland (hereinafter “the instant construction”). As long as the defendant diverted the instant land to a parking lot without obtaining permission from the permission authority, it can be sufficiently recognized that the crime of violating the Farmland Act can be established, and the judgment of the court below which acquitted the defendant, is erroneous in the misapprehension of legal principles.

2. The lower court determined that the instant land has been used as miscellaneous land for a long time and lost its shape as farmland, and that it could not be deemed farmland for a long period of time. In response to the examination of the permission for farmland diversion by public officials, the lower court found that the Defendant requested G to perform the instant construction for the purpose of creating appearance as if the instant land was used as farmland; ② the Defendant requested G to construct the garage building immediately after obtaining the permission for farmland diversion, and would use the site as a parking lot, while requesting G to take the instant construction around June 2013, the lower court held that “the instant land should be seen as farmland.” The instant land should be seen as farmland.” Accordingly, the lower court requested public officials to change the soil sub-construction work on the instant land, which would have caused the instant land to be seen as farmland; ③ as to the edge of the cornered surface, G had tin covered at approximately KRW 78 cm, and the Defendant did not think that the instant land had been used as farmland, ④ The Defendant did not take any necessary measures from the beginning to the extent of soil.