1. Revocation of the first instance judgment.

2. The plaintiff's claim is dismissed.

3. All costs of the lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

Facts of recognition

The reasons why this court is stated in this part are 6 pages of the first instance judgment.

1) First, the head of the orchard Tax Office’s “C” in the main sentence of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act is the same as the reasoning of the judgment of the first instance, except that the head of the orchard Tax Office considers “C” as “C,” and thus, refers to the reasoning of the judgment in accordance with the main sentence of Article 420 of the same Act. The same applies to the legal doctrine related to the determination (amended by Act No. 9913,

Article 80(1)3 of the former National Tax Collection Act provides that “the director of the tax office shall distribute the proceeds from sale of attached property and the deposit interest thereof, etc. pursuant to Article 81.” Article 81(1) provides that “The money under Article 80(1)2 and 3 shall be apportioned to the following national taxes, additional dues, disposition fees for arrears and other claims.” Article 81(3) provides that “The bonds secured by the right of lease on a deposit basis or mortgage related to attached property shall be apportioned to the owner of a right of lease on a deposit basis.” In addition, the latter part of Article 83(1) of the former National Tax Collection Act provides that “The person subject to distribution shall request the head of the tax office to distribute before preparing a distribution statement.” Examining the contents and purport of the above provisions, the right of lease on a deposit basis is extinguished due to the expiration of the term of existence or termination of the contract to lease on a deposit basis, and even if there is an opposing power, the buyer may not be deemed as having any special objection to the buyer who purchased the right to lease on a deposit basis.