1. The plaintiff (Counterclaim defendant)'s appeal is dismissed.

2. The claim of the Defendant (Counterclaim Plaintiff) added by this Court.

1. The reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance cited by the court of first instance is as follows: “The real estate (hereinafter “the instant real estate”) with respect to the second floor of the second floor of the judgment of the court of first instance (hereinafter “the instant real estate”)”; “the instant house” with respect to the third floor of the instant house shall be deemed as “the second floor of the instant house”; and the Plaintiff and the Defendant’s additional assertion added by this court shall be deemed as indicated in the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance, except for the addition of the judgment as set forth in the following paragraph (2). Therefore, it shall be cited by the main sentence of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act.

2. Additional determination

A. Determination 1 on the Plaintiff’s assertion 1) The Plaintiff’s assertion that the Defendant resided on the first floor of the instant housing does not exist any longer at the Plaintiff’s request for delivery. As such, the Plaintiff, as the owner of the instant housing, sought the delivery of the first floor of the instant housing to the Defendant on the ground of the exclusion of disturbance.

B) Even if the purchaser of the land did not obtain the registration of ownership transfer, if the land was delivered as a result of the execution of the sales contract, it shall be deemed that the right to possess and use the land has arisen as the validity of the sales contract (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2006Da30570, Sept. 22, 2006). On February 8, 1989, the Plaintiff and the Defendant recognized the Defendant’s deposit for the second floor of the instant housing as the investment deposit and the loans to the former owner C as the investment deposit, and agreed that the amount of KRW 3,00,000,000 among each of the instant real estate shall be the Defendant’s share. On the same day, the right to lease on the second floor of the instant housing was cancelled, and the Defendant was residing in the first floor of the instant housing. In light of the above recognition, the Plaintiff and the Defendant did not obtain the Plaintiff’s lease on the instant housing and the Defendant’s lease on a deposit basis, instead of cancelling the lease on a deposit.