The prosecutor's appeal is dismissed.

1. The main point of the grounds for appeal is that the lower court’s punishment (the imprisonment of eight months, the suspension of execution of two years, the observation of protection, and the attendance order for the treatment of sexual assault 40 hours) is too unhued and unreasonable.

2. In light of the fact that the sentencing based on the statutory penalty is a discretionary judgment made within a reasonable and reasonable scope, taking into account the factors that are the conditions for sentencing under Article 51 of the Criminal Act, based on the statutory penalty, and the fact that the sentencing conditions are not changed after the appellate court’s ex post facto nature, etc., it is reasonable to respect the first instance judgment in a case where there is no change in the conditions for sentencing compared with the first instance judgment, and the first instance judgment does not deviate from the reasonable scope of discretion. Even though the first instance judgment is within the reasonable scope of discretion, it is desirable to reverse the first instance judgment on the sole ground that the sentence differs from the appellate court’s opinion, and to refrain from imposing a sentence that does not differ from the first instance judgment (see Supreme Court Decision 2015Do3260, Jul. 23, 2015). In addition, the lower court’s judgment did not have any special change in the sentencing conditions compared with the first instance judgment, and it is acknowledged that the Defendant had been detained for four months in the lower court’s detention, and that the first instance judgment is too unreasonable.

Therefore, the prosecutor's improper argument of sentencing is without merit.

3. In conclusion, the prosecutor’s appeal is dismissed in accordance with Article 364(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act, and it is so decided as per Disposition.