1. The Defendant’s KRW 35,00,000 and the Plaintiff’s annual rate of KRW 5% from January 1, 2006 to July 6, 2015.

1. In full view of the purport of the entire argument in Gap evidence No. 1 as to the cause of the claim, the defendant, around August 21, 2003, borrowed KRW 35 million from the plaintiff from around August 21, 2003, and prepared a loan certificate to the plaintiff on December 11, 2005, stating that the above borrowed amount of KRW 35,000,000 shall be repaid until December 31, 2005.

Therefore, barring any special circumstance, the Defendant is obligated to pay to the Plaintiff the amount of KRW 35,00,000 and damages for delay calculated at the rate of 5% per annum as stipulated by the Civil Act from January 1, 2006 to July 6, 2015, the delivery date of a copy of the complaint of this case, and 20% per annum as stipulated by the Act on Special Cases concerning Expedition, etc. of Legal Proceedings from the next day to the day of full payment.

2. Judgment on the defendant's defense of extinctive prescription

A. The defendant's defense is the plaintiff's claim of KRW 35,00,000,000, which is the equipment cost claim, and three years have passed from December 11, 2005, which is the date when the loan certificate was prepared, and the prescription has expired in accordance with Article 163 of the Civil Act.

B. Determination 1) Although there is no evidence to find that KRW 35,00,000 that the Plaintiff paid to the Defendant was the consideration for the use of equipment, the Defendant rather prepared a loan certificate as seen earlier with the Plaintiff. Therefore, the Plaintiff’s claim shall be deemed a general loan refund claim, and the period of extinctive prescription shall be 10 years pursuant to Article 162(1) of the Civil Act. Furthermore, the instant lawsuit was filed before 10 years elapse from December 11, 2005, which the Plaintiff claimed as the initial date of the extinctive prescription. Furthermore, the initial date of the extinctive prescription is the starting date of calculating the period corresponding to the requirements for the legal effect of the extinction of the obligation and constitutes a specific fact that constitutes the legal requirement for the claim of extinctive prescription, and thus, it is subject to the principle of pleadings. Accordingly, if the initial date of the extinctive prescription is different from the initial date of the extinctive prescription