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(영문) 춘천지방법원 2020.01.17 2019노667 (1)
사기
Text

The second part of the judgment of the first instance and the second part of the judgment shall be reversed.

The second offense of the original judgment of the court of first instance is the defendant.

Reasons

1. The sentence sentenced by the first instance judgment (4 months of imprisonment with prison labor for the crime No. 1 as stated in the original judgment, and 6 months of imprisonment for the crime No. 2 as stated in the original judgment), and the sentence sentenced by the second instance judgment (one year and two months of imprisonment) is too unreasonable.

2. Determination

A. On the judgment of the court of first instance on the 2nd crime and the 2nd judgment, this court decided to concurrently examine each appeal case against the 1nd judgment and the 2nd judgment. Each of the crimes of the 2nd judgment and the 2nd judgment of the 2nd judgment of the 1nd judgment are concurrent crimes under the former part of Article 37 of the Criminal Act, and the 38(1) of the Criminal Act is a concurrent crime under Article 37 of the 2nd judgment

This Court has no choice but to reverse this part of the judgment below.

B. Determination of sentencing on the first instance judgment of the first instance court is based on statutory penalty, and discretion is given within reasonable and appropriate scope, taking into account the factors constituting conditions for sentencing under Article 51 of the Criminal Act, based on the statutory penalty.

However, considering the unique area of sentencing of the first instance court that is respected under the principle of trial priority and the principle of directness taken by our Criminal Procedure Act and the nature of the ex post facto review of the appellate court, it is reasonable to reverse the unfair judgment of the first instance court only in cases where it is deemed that the judgment of the first instance court exceeded the reasonable scope of discretion when comprehensively considering the conditions of sentencing in the course of the first instance sentencing review and the sentencing criteria, etc., or where it is deemed unfair to maintain the first instance sentencing as it is in full view of the materials newly discovered in the course of the appellate court’s sentencing review.

In the absence of such exceptional circumstances, it is desirable to respect the sentencing of the first instance court in the absence of such exceptional circumstances.

(see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 2015Do3260, Jul. 23, 2015). There is no significant change in circumstances that may consider the sentencing of Defendant after the lower judgment.

The records of this case are recorded.

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