1. Of the judgment of the court of first instance, the Plaintiff’s position in the position of the CGeneral Assembly (Dong-dong) as Defendant Incorporated Foundation on April 19, 2015.

1. The reasons for the court’s explanation concerning this case are as follows: (a) with respect to the part on which the plaintiff seeks confirmation of invalidity of a disposition of suspension from the position of wood on April 19, 2015 against the CGeneral Assembly (joint side) which is a defendant foundation, the plaintiff shall make an additional decision as to the legitimacy of the lawsuit as described in paragraph (2) and dismiss the lawsuit corresponding to that part, and not make a decision as to the merits, the corresponding part of the reasons for the judgment of the first instance is the same as the corresponding part of the reasons for the judgment of the court of first instance; and (b) thus

2. We examine the legality of the part of the instant lawsuit seeking confirmation of the invalidation of the disposition of suspension from office for wood as of April 19, 2015 against the CGeneral Assembly (Joint Partners) as the Defendant Incorporated Foundation, ex officio.

According to the statement in Gap evidence No. 3-1, the period of suspension from office is from April 19, 2015 to April 18, 2016. Since the period of suspension from office has already expired during the litigation of this case, the plaintiff has no interest in filing a lawsuit to seek confirmation of invalidity of the suspension from office.

(See Supreme Court Decision 2002Da57904 delivered on January 10, 2003, etc.). Accordingly, the part seeking confirmation of invalidity of the above suspension disposition in the instant lawsuit became unlawful because there was no benefit of lawsuit during the instant lawsuit, and thus, the benefit of lawsuit was lost.

3. As such, the part of the lawsuit in this case seeking confirmation of invalidity of the disposition of suspension from office against the C general meeting (joint side) as of April 19, 2015 against the C general meeting of the Defendant Incorporated Foundation should be dismissed as unlawful. Since the judgment of the first instance is unfair in conclusion as to this part of the judgment, it is so unfair that the judgment of the first instance has different conclusions, and the above part was partially accepted by the Plaintiff, and the lawsuit corresponding to the revoked part is dismissed, and the remaining appeal is dismissed as it is without merit, and it